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NOTES
Enforceability of Religious Law in Secular CourtsIt's Kosher, But Is It Constitutional?
In several different contexts-for example, in enforcing contracts
that refer to religious law or in enforcing secular laws that use religious terminology-secular courts may be called upon to apply and
even to interpret laws established by religious bodies. The limitations imposed by the first amendment on the courts in these areas
will be discussed here in the specific context of Judaism. It is the
thesis of this Note that the courts may not be as constrained in enforcing laws of religious bodies and in resolving disputes about those
laws as would appear at first glance.
In Wenerv. Wener,1 a New York court faced this problem in deciding whether to award child support payments in a divorce proceeding between a husband and wife who had been married in an
Orthodox Jewish ceremony. In accordance with Jewish tradition, at
the time of the marriage the couple had signed an agreement called
a ketuba, which provided, among other things, that they were "betrothed according to the Laws of Moses and Israel" and that the
husband assumed all obligations "as are prescribed by our religious
statutes."2 The ketuba, which was also signed by the officiating rabbi
and two other witnesses, was written in Hebrew, Aramaic, and
English.8
When Mr. and Mrs. Wener later decided to adopt a child, Mrs.
Wener went to Florida and returned with a female infant, who was
I. 59 Misc. 2d 957, l!Ol N.Y.S.2d 237 (Sup. Ct. 1969), afjd., 35 App. Div. 2d 50, 312
N.Y.S.2d 815 (1970).
2. 59 Misc. 2d at 959, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 240. The phrase "the Laws of Moses and Israel"
refers to the laws of the Jewish people (not to the modern state of Israel). As the ketuba
itself docs not list the specific obligations of a husband to his wife, the extent of the husband's obligations can only be determined by reference to that law. There is no single
codification of Jewish law. The Shulhan Arokh (completed by Joseph Caro in 1542) is
the most authoritative code of Jewish law, see 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 1475 (1971), but
it is not the last word. Moses Isserles added several notes recording his differences with
Caro's work. See 5 id. at 650-51. The other major compilation is the code of Maimonides
(compiled IISO), which differs in many conclusions of law from the Shulhan Arokh.
See 5 id. at 638-42. Each of these works relies heavily on the Babylonian and Palestinian
Talmuds, see 5 id. at 755, which may have to be consulted for a fuller understanding
of the codified law. Further, all of the above works are heavily annotated with commentaries and, in several cases, commentaries on the commentaries. In addition, there
exists an extensive Responsa literatur-responses by rabbis to particular legal questions-that goes back to Talmudic times. See 5 id. at 633. In back of all this stand the
Five Books of Moses, which are said to contain 613 commandments. See 5 id. at 760.
3. 59 Misc. 2d at 959, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 240. Traditionally the ketuba is signed just
before the Jewish wedding service. However, Reform Jews generally oinit the ketuba.
Finkelstein, The Jewish Religion: Its Beliefs and Practices, in 2 THE JEWs: THEIR
HisroRY, CULTURE, AND RELIGION 1739, 1789-90 (3d ed. L Finkelstein 1960).
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never adopted4 but lived with the couple for thirteen months, until
the husband and wife separated. It was this child for whom the wife
requested child support.
The court granted her request on two alternative grounds. First,
it found an agreement to adopt, which created an obligation of the
husband to support the child.5 This finding was based on, among
other things, the husband's cooperation in making arrangements for
his wife's trip, his supplying the child with the necessities of life
after the wife's return, his naming the baby girl after his grandmother in a ceremony in a synagogue, and his reference to the child
as his "darling daughter." 6
Second, the trial court found that, even absent an agreement to
adopt, the marriage contract bound the husband to support the child
because the Jewish law to which it referred requires that a head of a
household who takes in a child provide for its support.7 In arriving
at this conclusion, the court referred extensively to Jewish legal
sources. 8
The appellate division affirmed only on the first ground, holding that the husband's support obligation rested upon an implied
contract and equitable estoppel.9 However, it disapproved of the
lower tribunal's reliance, in its alternative holding, on Jewish law:
New York cannot apply one law to its Jewish residents and another law to all others. If our law does not require a husband to
support a child whom he has never agreed to adopt, the court cannot
refuse to apply such law because the tenets of the parties' religion
dictate otherwise. Application of religious law would raise grave
constitutional problems of equal protection and separation of church
and state. 10
4. 59 Misc. 2d at 959, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 239-40.
5. 59 Misc. 2d at 959, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
6. 59 Misc. 2d at 959, 961, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 239, 241. He also claimed the child as a
dependent on his federal income tax return under the category "children" and sent
the child a card signed "Love, Dad." 35 App. Div. 2d at 52, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
7. 59 Misc. 2d at 959-60, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
8. 59 Misc. 2d at 960-61, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 240-42.
9. 35 App. Div. 2d at 53, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
10. 35 App. Div. 2d at 54, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 819. The appellate court relied on two
law review notes. 35 App. Div. 2d at 54, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 819. One of these commenta•
tors said: "The court's reliance on the fact that the parties involved were of a par•
ticular faith and entitled to special treatment and the application of law particular to
only people of that faith, appears to be a violation of the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution." Note, Domestic Relations-Child Support-Ketuba as
Grounds for Child Support Claim Notwithstanding Lack of Formal Adoption Proceeding, 15 N.Y. L. FORUM 973, 978 (1969). The other stated: "The problem arises from
the fact that if the parties were not Jewish, Jewish law would not apply•••• The
result is that New York would be applying one law to Jews and another to all other
New York citizens.•.• The New York legislature could not require only Jews to support minor children brought into their homes; and the courts may not accomplish
this same result." Note, Jewish Law: A Misapplication in New York, 4 ISRAEL L. REv.
578, 580 (1969).
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The appellate division's concern for equal protection would be
warranted if one law were applied to Jews solely because they are
Jews and another to Gentiles solely because they are not Jews. Such
a distinction bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose and would violate the fourteenth amendment.11 However, the
application of Jewish law by the trial court in Wener was predicated
not upon the parties' religion or race, but upon the marriage contract
that the parties had voluntarily signed. The court was merely enforcing the contract. There was no indication that a Jew would be required to enter into such a contract by New York law; nor did the
trial court rule that a non-Jew who entered into a similar contract
would not be bound by the substantive provisions referring to Jewish
law.
Wener also raises a second, and more complex, issue-whether
the first amendment prohibits a secular court from enforcing religious law. The relevant portion of the first amendment provides that
"[c]ongress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."12 The first amendment has
been applied, through the fourteenth amendment, to the states and
thus to the actions of state civil courts.13 It could be argued that enforcing Jewish law through the enforcement of the ketuba, as the
trial court in Wener would have done, violates the constitutional
prohibition against state "establishment of religion."
The Supreme Court has defined "establishment," as used in the
first clause of the first amendment, as "sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." 14 Thus,
it would clearly be improper for the government to create a church.15
However, the scope of the prohibition found in the establishment
clause encompasses more than such clear and direct involvement; it
also forbids action that is merely a "step" in the direction of establishment of religion. 16 In determining what action falls into that
category, the Supreme Court has interpreted the establishment clause
to prohibit state action that (1) lacks a secular purpose, (2) has a
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) entangles
the government "excessively" with religion.17
The trial court in Wener, it should be repeated, merely intended
to effectuate the parties' contractual promises. Thus, its purpose was
11. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
14. Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
15. Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
16. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
17. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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secular. It did not require that Jewish law apply to all Jews, which
would have had the primary effect of advancing a certain religion,
but rather enforced the ketuba as a contract. Had Mr. and Mrs.
Wener, in their marriage contract, made no general reference to
Jewish law, but instead specifically listed the obligations that they
intended to assume, including the obligation of the husband to provide child support during and after the marriage, the appellate court
would have enforced the specified contractual obligations. It should
have reached the same result even though the marriage contract used
a shorthand reference to such obligations "as are prescribed by
our religious statutes." In using Jewish legal sources to determine
what those obligations are, the trial court was merely discerning the
intent of the parties as a question of fact.
In Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 18 the court acknowledged the contractual
nature of the ketuba. The plaintiffs sued to eject their stepmother
from the house in which she was living. As a defense, the stepmother
pleaded her rights under a ketuba19 that she had made with the plaintiffs' father, alleging that it served as an antenuptial property settlement. The appellate division affirmed the trial court's denial of the
plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that the trial
court should be given an opportunity to investigate the circumstances
surrounding the making of the ketuba. 20 While the court recognized
that it may not enforce religious law per se, it ruled that a ketuba
could be enforced as a contract21 in so far as_ it is not contrary to
state law. 22
If the Hurwitz decision were followed in Wener, the ketuba
would be enforced so long as there was an intent to make a contract.
The fact that it was signed as part of the marriage ritual might indicate that the parties merely intended to perform a ceremonial act and
18. 216 App. Div. 362, 215 N.Y.S. 184 (1926).
19. The agreement was referred to in Hurwitz as a "koshuba," which is a misspelling of "kesubah," a dialectical variant of "ketuba."
20. 216 App. Div. at 365, 215 N.Y.S. at 187. The ketuba in Hurwitz was \\Titten
entirely in Hebrew, creating sufficient ambiguity to necessitate a trial to consider the
circumstances at the time of execution.
21. 216 App. Div. at 365, 215 N.Y.S. at 187. Compare this distinction between en•
forcing a contract in which the parties agree to be bound by Jewish law and enforcing
the Jewish law per se with Professor Paulsen's analysis of adoption statutes that contain a "religious matching" provision. According to Paulsen, "these laws are constitutional • • • because their purpose is to determine religious training with reference to
a private rather than a governmental preference," thus avoiding the state action
necessary to constitute an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Paulsen, Constitutional Problems of Utilizing a Religious Factor in Adoptions and Placements of
Children, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE II7, 141 (D. Oaks ed. 1963).
However, if a violation of constitutional rights is found, court enforcement of the
contract may satisfy the state action requirement. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. l
(1948).
22. 216 App. Div. at 365, 215 N.Y.S. at 187.
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not to form a contract.23 However, this is a factual issue that goes to
the existence of a contract rather than to the problem of separation
of church and state. Although, as noted by the appellate court in
Wener, 24 New York statutes and case law do not require a man to
support a child not his own issue that he has not agreed to adopt,
neither do they prohibit the assumption of that obligation by contract. Such a contract benefits the child and should not be unenforceable as against public policy.
I£ there had been a dispute within Judaism over the extent of the
obligations imposed by Jewish law as they were referred to by the
Wener ketuba, more complicated first amendment problems would
have arisen, for the court may have been called upon to decide which
of two or more interpretations to follow. This would certainly involve some entanglement in religious affairs and may have the unconstitutional effect of favoring one branch of the religion over
another. 25
No such problem would arise where the matter has been previously ruled upon by a proper church tribunal, for secular courts
must regard the decisions of a religious court on the correct meaning
of a disputed religious doctrine as conclusive.26
However, if the parties expect a secular court to resolve the dispute, a serious constitutional problem does arise. In Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church,21 the Supreme Court ruled that the first amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving "controversies over religious doctrine and practice" even when a resolution is relevant to a suit, such
as a property dispute, that is properly before the court.28 In Presbyterian Church, two local churches and the general Presbyterian
church, from which they had withdrawn in a dispute over doctrine,
contested the ownership of property occupied by the local churches.
Instead of utilizing internal church tribunals, the local churches
sought to enjoin the general church from trespassing on the disputed
23. See G. HOROWl'IZ, THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW 315-16 (1953). In some cases the
ketuba may be written only in Aramaic. If neither party understood that language, it
could be contended that the parties were unaware that they were signing a contract.
24. 35 App. Div. 2d at 54, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
25. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952).
26. Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. I (1929) (decision by the Archbishop of Manila
that canon law prohibits petitioner from being appointed as chaplain must be accepted
as conclusive by the secular court in the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness).
The Gonzalez result was approved in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94,
116 (1952), and Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969). See also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679,
722·35 (1872).
27. 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (Brennan, J.).
28. 393 U.S. at 440. See also School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 243 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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property. They argued that the property was theirs under Georgia
common law, which implied "a trust of local church property for
the benefit of the general church on the sole condition that the
general church adhere to its tenets of faith and practice existing at
the time of affiliation by the local churches."29 The plaintiffs alleged
that the condition had failed. The Georgia supreme court affirmed
a decision in favor of the local churches by a trial court that had allowed a jury to determine "whether the actions of the general church
'amount to fundamental or substantial abandonment of the original
tenets and doctrines of the [general church].' " 30 The Supreme Court
reversed on first amendment grounds. 31 It felt that allowing secular
courts to determine a matter "at the very core of a religion-the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of
those doctrines to the religion"32-might "[inhibit] the free development of religious doctrine and [implicate] secular interests in matters
of purely ecclesiastical concern.''88 The Court remanded, insisting
that "the departure-from-doctrine element of Georgia's implied trust
theory can play no role in any future judicial proceedings.''34
Although it was not expressly enunciated by the Supreme Court
until a year after Presbyterian Church,85 the entanglement doctrine
requires the same result. In Lemon v. Kurtzman 36 the Court held
that governmental aid to parochial schools in the form of teachers'
salaries was impermissible because it required continuing state surveillance and control over religious institutions.87 The Court in
Presbyterian Church seemed similarly concerned with the excessive
state involvement that may arise in the course of interpreting church
doctrines and assessing their relative significance.38
However, the first amendment need not bar court enforcement
of the Wener ketuba, even where there is some dispute over the
Jewish law in question, for it is not clear that the Jewish law regarding child support is "religion" within the meaning of the first
amendment.39
29. 393 U.S. at 442-43.
30. 393 U.S. at 443-44.
31. The Court's opinion never makes clear whether the impermissibility is based
upon the establishment or the free exercise clause of the first amendment. See Kauper,
Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 1969
SUP. CT. R.Ev. 347, 374-76.
32, 393 U.S. at 450.
33. 393 U.S. at 449.
34. 393 U.S. at 450 (emphasis original).
35. See Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
36. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
37. 403 U.S. at 619-20.
38. 393 U.S. at 450.
39. United States Supreme Court interpretations of the scope of "religion" in the
context of the first amendment are ambiguous. The early view was that religion was
primarily concerned with the relationship between man and God and the obliga-
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The term "Judaism" encompasses not only a "religion," but also
a culture and a way of life that goes beyond primarily religious matters.40 Jewish law, consequently, is not composed solely of "religious
law," but is essentially "racial, tribal, or national," as a New York
court pointed out in S.S. & B. Live Poultry Corp. v. Kashruth Association.41 That court recognized that, although the entire system of
Jewish law might be popularly termed "religious," it is more properly
"divisible into two parts, one ... strictly religious, because concerned
with the relations between man and God, the other essentially . . .
secular, as controlling the relations be~v-een man and man." 42 The
first of these two divisions, which deals with such things as worship
practices and dietary obligations, will here be called "theohuman";
the second, which includes, for example, marriage and kinship obligations, will be called "interpersonal."
The Jewish law of child support, and other Jewish interpersonal
laws, may be termed "religious" only in the sense that traditional
belief holds that God gave the entire law to Moses at Mount Sinai.43
Thus, fulfillment of an interpersonal law would incidentally serve a
religious end, in that it is believed to be in general accordance with
God's will.44 This should not be sufficient to classify interpersonal
tions owed by man to God. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (Field,
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting). Recent decisions have hinted at a broader interpretation. In United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), the Court interpreted the Selective Service Act's requirement that one claiming conscientious objector status be opposed to all wars because
of "religious training or belief." The Court concluded that to meet the Act's definition of religious belief-"an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not including]
essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or merely a personal moral
code"-the objector must have a "sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in
the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by • • • God" in the lives of
persons clearly within the exemption. 380 U.S. at 176. Expressions by persons claiming
conscientious objector status of, for example, a belief in "'some power manifest in
nature ••• the supreme expression' that helps man in ordering his life" were found
to meet the statutory definition. 380 U.S. at 188. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 206
(1972), may have restricted the Seeger definition. In its general discussion of religion
(the particular sect in question-the Amish-met any conceivable definition) the Court
excluded beliefs that are "philosophical and personal." 406 U.S. at 216. Justice Douglas,
in dissent, views this as a retreat from the Seeger definition. 406 U.S. at 247-48. It is
submitted that acceptance for first amendment purposes of any such broad definition
as that in Seeger would lead to absurd results. The Court in Seeger notes that to
some, religion is found in "a way of life envisioning as its ultimate goal the day
when all men can live together in perfect understanding and peace." 380 U.S. at
174. Acceptance of this belief as religion could lead to a finding that the entire
system of American law is a nontheistic religion, for the preamble to the Constitution
states the purpose of that document in similar terms: "In Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility ••• .''
40. See generally M. KAPLAN, JUDAISM AS A ClvruzATION (1934).
41. 158 Misc. 358, 360, 285 N.Y.S. 879, 883 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
42. 158 Misc. at 360, 285 N.Y.S. at 884.
43. See Epstein, Introduction to Seder Nezikin, in BABYLONIAN TALMUD, pt. 4,
v. 1, at xxxii (I. Epstein ed. 1935); s. BELKIN, IN His !MAGE 15-19 (1960).
44. See Chavel, Foreword to MAIMONIDES, THE CoMMANDMENTS vii (C. Chavel ed.
1967).

J.). Cf.
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laws as "religious" within the meaning of the first amendment, for
Jewish interpersonal law is in this respect strikingly similar to AngloAmerican law, much of which also is religious in origin and may incidently serve religious goals. 45 For example, in Dominus Rex &
Tayler, 46 Lord Hale expressed the view that "Christianity is part of
the law itself" and a court may seek to redress injuries to God just as
it may punish those who injure man. In the nineteenth century,
several American courts echoed Hale's view in cases concerning
such matters as Sunday closing laws,47 the validity of charities,48 and
domestic relations.49
Today, American courts would almost certainly reject Lord
Hale's extreme view as violating the establishment clause. 150 Mary45. Secular prohibitions against murder and theft, for instance, may satisfy the
requirements and purposes of the ten commandments and yet not violate the establishment clause. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 462 (1961) (separate opinion
of Frankfurter, J.).
46. 84 Eng. Rep. 906 (K.B. 1675).
47. Shover v. State, 10 Ark. 259 (1849).
48. Vidal v. Girard's Exrs., 43 U.S. (2 How.) 126, 198-201 (1844); Field v. Drew
Theological Seminary, 41 F. 371, 374 (C.C.D. Del. 1890).
49. Goodrich v. Goodrich, 44 Ala. 670, 673-75 (1870).
The widespread influence of religious doctrine on law is seen in the application
of the common law definition of burglary. In general, burglary is confined to "the
breaking and entering, in the nighttime, of the dwelling or mansion house of another,
with intent to commit a felony therein." 13 AM. JUR. 2D, Burglary § I (1964). However,
the dwelling house requirement did not apply to the burglary of churches. See 3 E.
CoKE, INSilTUTES •64; McGraw v. State, 234 Md. 273, 199 A.2d 229 (1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 862 (1964); Trevino v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 255, 254 S.W.2d 786 (1953). Lord
Coke explained this curious exception by resorting to the religious belief that a church is
the "dwelling house of God." E. CoKE, supra. For a modern court to predicate its conclusion of law on the religious belief that God dwells in a church would certainly violate
the constitutional principle that the law may not "support any religious tenets." Davis
v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). Also it would contravene Justice Miller's exhortation
that "the law ••• is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of
no sect." Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872). In the words of the
Hurwitz case, it would be enforcing religious dogma per se. 216 App. Div. at 365,
215 N.Y.S. at 187. For a time, however, it seemed that Maryland, whose burglary
statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 29 (1971), permits prosecution for common law
burglary, actually accepted Lord Coke's rationale. Thus, a trial judge's charge to the
jury that mentioned Lord Coke's reason was held not to violate the Constitution.
McGraw v. State, 234 Md. 273, 277-78, 199 A.2d 229, 231-32, cert. denied, 379 U.S.
862 (1964). Further, an indictment that charged the defendants with attempting to
burglarize "the dwelling house of God" was held to be sufficient, "though not in
commendable form." Dortch v. State, I Md. App. 173, 175, 229 A.2d 148, 150 (Ct.
Spec. App. 1967). Finally the Maryland courts rejected Lord Coke's rationale and
simply concluded that churches are an exception to the dwelling house requirement.
See Sizemore v. State, 10 Md. App. 682, 688, 272 A.2d 824, 827 (Ct. Spec. App. 1971).
50. Thomas Jefferson was of the opinion that Hale's remark was erroneous. He
traced Hale's view to earlier writers that, he felt, erroneously equated the use of
the law of ecclesiastical courts with the use of the Bible itself. Jefferson, Whether
Christianity Is a Part of the Common Law, Appendix. to VmGINIA REPORTS 137-42
Gefferson 1829). But see State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 555 (Del. 1837).
Some nineteenth century American judges also criticized the view that Christianity
is part of the common law. E.g., Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio 387, 391 (1853). In an
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land, for example, has declared its blasphemy law unconstitutional
on this basis.51 Nevertheless, the courts still recognize that religious
beliefs are at the foundation of American society. Thus, Justice
Douglas wrote, "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,"52 and Judge Cardozo maintained that
"public policy" is formed in part from society's religious values.53
Moreover, as Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his separate opinion
in McGowan v. Maryland: "State codes and the dictates of faith
touch the same activities. Both aim at human good, and in their respective views of what is good for man they may concur or they may
conflict. No constitutional command which leaves religion free can
avoid this quality of interplay."54 It would be erroneous, however, to
characterize Anglo-American laws as "religious."55 Even when dealing with laws that originally arose in a religious context-such as
those against polygamy56 and Sunday labor57-the Supreme Court has
recognized that the legislation primarily serves a secular purpose and
is thus not subject to the first amendment's prohibitions.
By analogy, those laws of Judaism, and possibly other religions,
that deal with interpersonal relations have secular purposes and need
not automatically be included in the first amendment category of
"religion." When they are properly before the court-as when they
are referred to in a contract, a trust, or an otherwise constitutional
legislative enactment-the court should interpret them as part of its
fact-finding process, even where there is some dispute as to their
meaning. 58 Although observance of the Jewish laws regarding, for
interesting note in Swann v. Swann, 21 F. 299 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1884), the court criticized
Hill v. Wicker, 41 Ga. 449 (1871), which had based the restriction on Sunday labor
upon the ten commandments. Contending that the Sabbath in the Bible refers to
Saturday, not Sunday, the court remarked that the assumption to the contrary "illustrates the danger of a civil court, which deals only with the temporal affairs of
men, predicating a judgment on its interpretation of the Bible commands relating to
spiritual affairs." 21 F. at 308.
51. State v. West, 9 Md. App. 270, 263 A.2d 602 (Ct. Spec. App. 1970).
52. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
53. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 72 (1921).
54. 366 U.S. 420, 461-62 (1961).
55. See Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Rundell, 424 Pa. 505, 227 A.2d 895, cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 937 (1967).
56. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
57. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961),
58. For example, the courts have granted Jewish cantors a tax exemption for parsonage allowances, deciding that they meet the statutory requirement of being
"minister[s] of the gospel." Salkov v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 190 (1966); Silverman v.
Commissioner, 57 T.C. 727 (1972), afjd., - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1973). In each case
the court made its determination of the cantor's status in part on the basis of
Jewish customary law. In Salkov the court noted that, while the rabbi alone can
decide matters of Jewish law, the cantor's function is to be a "sheliach tzibbur"
and "emissary of the congregation before the Almighty in prayer" and listed some of
the cantor's sacerdotal functions at the Sabbath and at festivals, 46 T.C. at 196, 198.
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instance, child support, bailments,59 debt, 60 landlord-tenant relations,61 real property,62 labor relations, 63 maritime cargo and charter
agreements,64 and torts 65 may, in a general sense, serve a religious
purpose in that one following the law lives in accord with the will
of God, the immediate effect and purpose of these laws is secular.66
Thus, in Wener the first amendment need not have deterred the
court from applying the Jewish law of child support if it was found
to be required under a valid contract, even if there had been a dispute as to its meaning.
A secular court's resolution of a dispute over a Jewish interpersonal law may inhibit Jewish courts from resolving the matter differently in a subsequent case. However, if a dispute over an interpersonal law is not a "religious" matter within the meaning of the
first amendment, such a result would not be unconstitutional.
Also, the secular resolution of a dispute over the meaning of an
interpersonal law may have an indirect impact on the development
of theohuman law, for in a complex body of laws a decision affecting
one part may indirectly affect the others. 67 Although a direct impact
on theohuman law would violate Presbyterian Church, a possible inFurthermore, in distinguishing a cantor from a Baptist minister of education, the
tax court in Silverman indicated that the court was required to consider the "mores
and customs" of each religion. 57 T.C. at 731.
Similarly, a federal court has indicated that a cantor is entitled to an exemption
from selective service as a clergyman. Application of Kanas, 385 F.2d 506, 509 (2d
Cir. 1967).
Judicial notice of religious beliefs is not uncommon. For example, reconciliation
agreements between husband and wife, enforceable in court, frequently incorporate
commonly held religious beliefs. One standard agreement takes notice that most people
believe that a child is the "handiwork of God," not merely the parents' product,
that God entrusts the parents with the child, and that the parents are God's agents
in raising the child. Burke, Conciliation-A New Approach to the Divorce Problem,
20 CAL. ST. B.J. 199, 211-12 (1955). See also State v. Olson, 287 Minn. 300, 178 N.W.2d
230 (1970) (judicial notice of the solemnity of the Catholic mass); In re Estate of May,
305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 486 (1953) (finding that Jewish law permits marriage between
an uncle and a niece).
59. E.g., BABYLONIAN TALMUD, pt. 4, v. 2, Baba Mezia 93a-93b, at 537-40 (I. Epstein
ed. 1935) [hereinafter BABYLONIAN TALMUD].
60. See 2 CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Creditor and Debtor 77-187
Oberman, L. Ginsberg&: H. Wolfson ed. 1949) [hereinafter CODE OF MAIMONIDES].
61. See, e.g., THE MlsBNAH, Baba Metzia 8.6, at 361-62 (H. Danby ed. 1923).
62. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 59, pt. 4, v. 3, Baba Bathra 28a, at 138.
63. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 59, pt. 4, v. 2, Baba Mezia 83a, at 476.
64. CODE OF MAIMONIDES, supra note 60, Hiring ch. 5, §§ 3-4, at 19-20.
65. See, e.g., BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 59, pt. 4, v. 1, Baba Kamma 9a, at 36.
66. See Epstein, supra note 42, at xxxiii. For example, the law of landlord-tenant
relations deals with such secular matters as the notice required for the termination of
leases (twelve months for commercial leases, one month for most residential leases of unspecified terms). See THE MISHNAH, Baba Metzia 8.6, at 261-62 (H. Danby ed. 1933).
See also L. FINKELSTEIN, THE PHARISEES (2d ed. 1962) (analysis of the social and
economic role of the Jewish law in the early Talmudic period).
67. See M. K.ADUSIDN, RABBINIC MIND 15 (1952).
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direct future effect on a Jewish court's resolution of a theohuman
matter seems remote and attenuated. Furthermore, any such effect
would be neutralized by the Jewish court's awareness that its decisions with respect to theohuman law will be conclusive in subsequent
litigation before a secular court. 68
Presbyterian Church, however, clearly forbids secular courts from
resolving theohuman disputes directly. A civil court might be called
upon to do this in, for example, a case involving the enforcement of
a criminal statute relating to kosher foods. 69 Several states have such
statutes, which provide for criminal penalties if a seller falsely represents food to be "kosher" 70 or "prepared in accordance with Orthodox
Hebrew religious requirements." 71
Even if there is no dispute over the meaning of the term "kosher"
or the content of "Orthodox Hebrew religious requirements," the
statutes themselves may be attacked as violating the first amendment
on the grounds that their primary purpose and effect is to aid Jews
in the observance of their religious rites. 72 Although not establishing
religion, enforcement of the statutes could be regarded as a forbidden
step in that direction. 73 However, these statutory provisions are more
appropriately seen as merely enacted to enforce the general state
policy against mislabeling and fraudulent misrepresentation in
sales.74 They do not single out adherents of the Jewish religion for
special protection. 15
68. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
69. Jewish kosher regulations are not merely a special way of preparing food. They
relate primarily to a relationship between man and God, as do all ritual obligations.
In contrast, court enforcement of a ketuba requires a husband to honor an interper•
sonal commitment.
70. E.g., D.C. CODE §§ 22-3404 to -3406 (1967). Cf. 21 C.F.R. § 3.202 (1973).
71. N.Y. AGRIC. &: MKTS. LAW §§ 201(a)-(d) (McKinney 1972). See also CAL. PENAL
CODE § 383(b) (West 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 196-97 (1971); MAss. ANN. LAws
§§ 94:156-57 (1967); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.297(e) (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 31:651 (1963).
72. But see People v. Goldberger, 163 N.Y.S. 663, 666 (N.Y. City Ct. Spec. Sess.
1916). See also Sossin Sys., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 262 S.2d 28, 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972), in which the court upheld a kosher food ordinance against a first amendment challenge. The court said that the ordinance was designed to safeguard the free
exercise of Jews in the practice of their religion.
73. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
74. E.g., N.Y. AGIUC. &: MKTS. I.Aw § 201 (McKinney 1972). The specific secular
reasons for enacting kosher food laws include the protection of buyers who expect a
higher standard of cleanliness in kosher food, People v. Atlas, 183 App. Div. 595, 596,
170 N.Y.S. 834, 836 (1918), and the prevention of the fraudulent sale of less expensive
nonkosher food at higher kosher prices. People v. Gordon, 172 Misc. 543, 545, 14
N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (N.Y. City Ct. Spec. Sess. 1939), revd. on other grounds, 258 App.
Div. 421, 16 N.Y.S.2d 833, afjd. mem., 283 N.Y. 707, 28 N.E.2d 717 (1940).
75. In New York, for example, the general mislabeling statute provides a more
severe penalty than does the specific kosher labeling law. Compare N.Y. Acruc. &: MKTS,
LAW § 201 (McKinney 1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 55.10, 70.15, 80.05 (McKinney 1972);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 392(b) (McKinney 1972) (misbranding generally-one year or
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Generally, the interpretation of the terms "kosher" or "Orthodox
Hebrew religious requirements" will pose no problem. For example,
in a 1925 suit challenging these terms as too indefinite to provide the
seller with adequate notice of what is allowed and what is prohibited,
the Supreme Court pointed out that the term "kosher" is generally
understood and that any possible uncertainty is not unlike similar
difficulties encountered in other criminal statutes.76
However, if a dispute did arise concerning the meaning of these
terms, arl attempted judicial resolution of the controversy may be
prohibited by Presbyterian Church because of the theohuman nature
of the dispute. 77
It could be argued that such a judicial determination is, like providing police and fire protection to synagogues, necessary to safeguard
the Jews' free exercise of religion. 78 This consideration did not deter
the Court in Presbyterian Church, where one effect of the Georgia
court's decision, reversed by the Supreme Court, was to protect the
local church in the observance of its religious beliefs and practices.
However, since there was a dispute between two segments of the
church, the over-all effect of protecting the local churches in this way
was to inhibit the general church in the free development of its
religious doctrine. Similarly, a resolution of a theohuman dispute by
a secular court should not be permitted.
The inability of secular courts to resolve controversies over
Jewish theohuman law should not render the kosher statutes unconstitutional. As pointed out above, 79 it is unlikely that the general requirements of the Jewish dietary laws will be disputed. Also, if a
showing of specific intent to defraud is required, 80 a bona fide belief
that the food is kosher will excuse the seller and render a judicial
determination of the meaning of the term unnecessary.
1000 dollars) with N.Y. Acruc. & MKTS. LAW§ 20l(d) {McKinney 1972) (kosher labelingone year or 500 dollars). See also People v. Atlas, 183 App. Div. 595, 170 N.Y.S. 834
(1918).
76. Hygrade Provisions Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925). See also People v. Atlas,
183 App. Div. 595, 170 N.Y.S. 834 (1918); Ehrlich v. Municipal Ct, 55 Cal. 2d 552, 360
P.2d 334, 11 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1961).
77. The diverse sources of Jewish law make such disputes with respect to specific
applications of the dietary laws possible. See note 2 supra. Cf. Tamarkin v. Children
of Israel, Inc., 2 Ohio App. 60, 206 N.E.2d 412 (1965), appeal dismissed, 384 U.S. 157
(1966) (disagreement over Jewish law regarding disinterment of bodies).
78. See People v. Goldberger, 163 N.Y.S. 663, 665 (N.Y. City Ct. Spec. Sess. 1916);
Sossin Sys., Inc., v. City of Miami Beach, 262 S.2d 28, 30 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1972).
A similar rationale has been used to uphold statutes prohibiting the disruption of
religious services. Ford v. State, 210 Tenn. 105, 110, 355 S.W.2d 102, 103-04, rehearing
denied, 210 Tenn. 105, 356 S.W.2d 726 (1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 994 (1964).
79. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
80. See Hygrade Provisions Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502-03 (1925), construing
New York statutes, chs. 580-81 [1922] N.Y. Laws 1314, substantially like the present
New York law, N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS, LAW§ 20l(a) {McKinney 1972).
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An accused seller may attempt to halt the prosecution by raising
a frivolous claim that the product he is selling is kosher. For example, the seller of a "kosher cheeseburger" might claim that it
meets the Jewish dietary requirements. A court might think itself
bound by Presbyterian Church to dismiss the charge, for the court
must make at least a cursory investigation of Jewish law to determine
that mixtures of meat and dairy products are unkosher. However,
since in such a case there is no real dispute between different segments of the religion, a court would not be promoting one branch
and inhibiting another. Moreover, no "excessive" entanglement of
church and state need be involved, for a superficial reading of the
Jewish law would be sufficient to dispose of the claim.
It should be noted that determining whether or not a given matter is theohuman or interpersonal might itself involve the court in
some entanglement in religious matters. Certain laws clearly fall into
one category or the other,81 but the classification of others may require closer analysis of their history and purpose. However, this
analysis is thrust upon the courts by the first amendment itself. As
Chief Justice Burger has said: "No perfect or absolute separation is
really possible; the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts-one that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement."82
81. See note 66 supra; text accompanying notes 56-66 supra.
82. Walz v. Tax Commn., 387 U.S. 664, 670 (1970).

